Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung -keine Bearbeitung) We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget limits and know their own budget limit but are incompletely informed about other contestants' budget limits. First, we solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn the budget limits of all players who are within the same alliance, and then decide independently about their own contest efforts. This type of alliance formation is beneficial for alliance members and neutral for players who do not belong to the alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and discuss the set of stable combinations of alliances.
Introduction
Participants in contests are often constrained by their budgets. Their willingness to expend e¤ort may often exceed what they are actually able to spend. If several players participate in a contest, the information about own and co-players'budget constraints is important, and the equilibrium outcome of the competition depends on the actual budgets and on the distribution of information about these budgets. In this paper we consider contests in which players are severely budget constrained, and in which the actual budget of each single player is private information. We study the role of groups of players who truthfully exchange information about their respective budgets. These groups are called "information alliances". Our main research questions are: How does the truthful mutual exchange of information about each other's budget limits within these groups a¤ect equilibrium behavior and players'equilibrium payo¤s? How does the formation of an alliance a¤ect the payo¤s of members of the alliance and how does it a¤ect outsiders? What does this imply for the willingness to take part in the formation of an alliance? The formation of an alliance typically involves some type of closer cooperation, possibly including joint actions, exchange of personnel, use of the same information infrastructure etc. For this reason we believe that alliances cause an information transfer between the members of the same alliance. The information transfer may be a by-product, as the formation of an alliance may also have a large number of other strategic aspects. Here we focus on the information exchange aspect and restrict the role of an alliance to this aspect, allowing the alliance members to compete and …ght independently.
These questions are relevant in two areas of political competition. Perhaps the most important example is military con ‡ict. Nation states engaged in war often use their whole military capacity, rather than considering which stock of their weapons they preserve for other purposes or future wars, suggesting that they are actually budget constrained. And a nation's actual military capacity is typically not perfectly known to adversaries. 1 Alliances may change the distribution of information.
Weitsman (1997) argues that alliances are instruments for managing possible con ‡ict 1 Stanley Kubrick's movie Dr. Strangelove illustrates the role of information. In the movie the US launches a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union, not knowing that the Soviet Union has installed the "doomsday machine" that is automatically triggered by the attack and causes an armageddon. outcome (see, e.g., Fearon 1995) . We borrow from their piecemeal evidence about the role of alliances as institutions that facilitate information transfer among its members, but pursue a di¤erent causal link between information and the outbreak of military con ‡ict that is more closely related to the standard economic theory of contests. In the formal analysis we rule out a bargaining stage, as successful bargaining requires the ability to commit on the bargained outcome. Our formal analysis reveals that information transmission in alliances reduces military con ‡ict. Another prediction of our results is also in line with casual empirical observations: the process of alliance formation and the exchange of information this may imply has a tendency to end up with the smallest possible set of alliances.
Another example from the area of political science is electoral competition.
The role of campaign spending, campaign contributions and the regulatory framework for electoral competition has been a focus of much research in political science. 3 budgets, or to let them know about one's own budget. The framework studied here applies and the question of information alliances becomes relevant if more than two candidates enter into the competition.
Suppose players' budgets actually limit their maximum (non-refundable) efforts in the equilibrium. After characterizing a su¢ cient condition for this constraint to be binding, we consider alliances and alliance formation in this framework. We study alliances that are de…ned as institutions that make the members of the alliance truthfully exchange information about the budget limits of all its members. Each player remains an independent player and chooses an independent e¤ort. Also, the prize is awarded to one of the players as a function of these individual e¤orts. However, players inside the alliance exchange information. This exchange may in ‡uence the strategic situation for players inside and outside this alliance. We …nd that an alliance of this type generally bene…ts the members of the alliance, whereas it has no payo¤ implications for non-members of the respective alliance. We allow for a partition of the set of players into multiple alliances, and we consider merger between alliances from a given partition. We …nd that, much like the formation of the alliance itself, the merger between alliances bene…ts the members of these alliances and has no payo¤ implications for non-members of the respective merging alliances. This result can be used for a characterization of the set of all stable alliance structures. We conclude from this analysis that information exchange about players'budget constraints or …ghting power is a strong incentive for forming an alliance. In the absence of countervailing e¤ects of the alliance, we …nd that the equilibrium structure of alliances has the smallest possible number of alliances.
This analysis is related to several areas of research. A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the contest without noise ("all-pay auctions"). While we also touch upon the case in which some players expend less than their budget and others may exhaust their budget, the focus of the analysis is on the case in which all players may expend their whole budget but have a positive payo¤ in expectation.
A key aspect of the analysis is the endogeneity of information at the stage of contest, due to the possible formation of alliances. Within these frameworks incomplete information about competitors'valuation of the prize leads to players'bids as functions of the players'valuations which in turn leads to total bid e¤orts that fall short of the valuation of the prize. 4 The …rst, and virtually only, paper addressing incomplete information about players' budget constraints in the all-pay auction is Che and Gale (1996) , who compare equilibrium payo¤s of the all-pay auction with the standard …rst-price winner-pay auction. 5 An endogenous choice of membership in one of several subgroups is considered in Konrad and Konvenock (2009a) . They analyse a complete information framework in which players self-select into subgroups, and the members of the same subgroup compete for a limited number of identical prizes. They focus on the coordination problem when players choose the subgroup they join and consider how this coordination problem depends on the number of players, subgroups and prizes.
5 costs in a future internal contest for the prize make such an alliance unattractive. The formation of alliances in situations of con ‡ict is therefore often considered a puzzle or paradox. 6 Budget constraints and the desire to overcome them by pooling e¤orts is one of the aspects that can make alliance formation desirable. 7 Our analysis focuses on a di¤erent aspect of alliance formation and reveals information exchange to be a potentially important information incentive for alliance formation. 8 The formal framework and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium are described in section 2. This section also discusses why the analysis is limited to the case in which the budget limitations are severe. Information alliances are analyzed in section 3. Merger and stability of a set of alliances are discussed in section 4. Section 5
summarizes the results and concludes.
Absence of alliance
Consider n players i 2 N = f1; :::; ng who compete in an all-pay contest in which the winner is awarded a prize and all other players receive no prize. Let all players value the winner prize equally at v = 1, and let these valuations be common knowledge. . This probability distribution is common 6 For a survey about alliances and alliance formation in contests, see Bloch (2009) . There are only some partial results explaining why alliances may actually bene…t the members of the alliance.
These include Skaperdas (1998) and Tan and Wang (1997) who suggest cost synergies in alliance members'e¤orts, and additional strategic options as in Kovenock and Roberson (2008) . 7 See, e.g., Cho, Jewell and Vohra (2002) and Konrad and Kovenock (2009b) . Whether or not alliances allow for pooling of alliance members'e¤orts depends on the institutional framework. 8 Some types of information spillovers between bidders have been considered in standard auctions.
In the context of standard (winner pay) …rst price auctions with incomplete information about bidders' procurement cost, Waehrer and Perry (2003) consider the role of merger between …rms.
The merger essentially eliminates the less e¢ cient bidder and this relaxes competition. Kim and Che (2004) also consider standard (winner pay) auctions if some bidders are informed about some of their rivals'valuations of the object that is auctioned. 9 We could allow for some asymmetry in the valuations of the winner prize. For a range of valuations for which expending an e¤ort that is equal to the whole own budget remains optimal, this does not change the nature of the bene…t of information exchange.
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knowledge. In addition, all players i learn their own budget limit m i , but not the budgets of the other players. Given the incomplete information all players i choose their own contest e¤ort which is denoted as x i . E¤orts are non-negative and cannot exceed the size of the respective player's budget. These e¤orts must be made in full and are non-refundable, irrespective of whether the player wins or does not win the prize. The winner prize is awarded to the player who chooses the highest e¤ort. If several players choose the same highest e¤ort, then the prize is randomly assigned to one of them with equal probability. Player i's payo¤ is equal to 10 i (x 1 ; :::; x n ) =
( 1 x i if i wins the prize
We search for the equilibrium function of e¤orts x i (m i ) that describes the players' choices x i as a function of their own budget m i . If the players'budgets are su¢ ciently high, the budget constraint is non-binding and the problem is turned into a fully symmetric standard all-pay auction with complete information (which is well studied).
Instead, we focus on cases in which the budget is small compared to the size of the prize; and, in which, in the equilibrium, the budget constraint is binding for all players.
The probability distribution F (m) from which the budget constraints are chosen is assumed to be continuous on the interval (0; b] and di¤erentiable on (0; b). These assumptions rule out mass points for positive values of m, but they are consistent with a possible mass point at m = 0. The probability density on the interior of the support is denoted by F 0 (m).
The existence of a mass point at zero is important for the type of equilibrium in which the budget constraints are payo¤ relevant for n > 2. Therefore it is important to note that this mass point has natural interpretations in many of the examples.
Players may be unable to choose positive e¤ort, with some probability. A communication breakdown or other exogenous shocks may prevent a country from military 10 This contest success function has received considerable support as an analytical tool by an analysis by Alcalde and Dahm (2010) . They show that all-pay auctions with su¢ ciently little noise have equilibria that are payo¤ equivalent to the equilibrium of the all-pay auction without noise. These encompass rent-seeking games with a high exponent in Tullock's (1980) generalized lottery contest, which have been analysed by Baye, de Vries (1994, 1999) . Note also that similar information exchange bene…ts that make information alliances attractive in our formal context would emerge for many other contest success functions, provided that players'budgets are su¢ ciently tight to make players expend their whole budgets. mobilization in time, or the decision to mobilize may be blocked by political opposition. In political contests some candidates may drop out of a given competition, due to a scandal, due to personal problems or for other reasons.
Given these assumptions, the following can be shown: Proof. Without loss of generality, consider player 1. Assume that all other players follow the equilibrium strategy. The expected payo¤ of player 1 as a function of x 1 is
0 for x 1 = 0, and
Hence
1 (0) 0, and
for all Proposition 1 provides a condition for which players always …nd it optimal to expend their entire budget; and for which, in the equilibrium, all players are budget constrained. The condition is (n 1)(F (m)) n 2 F 0 (m) 1 and this condition is ful…lled, for instance, for cumulative distributions which have a mass point of size
for n > 0 and a uniform distribution of the remaining probability mass on a su¢ ciently small interval (0; b]. Note that this equilibrium permits outcomes in which the players …nd out ex-post that they collectively expended more than the value of the prize. The condition (2) does not rule out that budgets m i in an interval close to the value of the prize have a positive probability mass. Accordingly, equilibrium outcomes may be observed in which all n players have drawn a budget in the range [1 2"; 1 "] with " positive, but close to zero, leading to e¤orts that sum up to more than n times 1 2".
The role of budget limits as binding constraints is particularly pronounced in the type of equilibrium in Proposition 1, that is, if the condition (2) holds. This is why we focus on the type of equilibrium in Proposition 1 when analyzing the formation 8 of information alliances in later sections. If, instead, the distribution of budget limits has su¢ cient weight on high budget values such that (2) does not hold, this removes much of the novel aspect of this analysis and leads to equilibrium outcomes that have been studied by Che and Gale (1996) . For distributions F (m) which give higher weights to higher budget limits, or with further mass points for positive amounts of e¤ort, it is much less straightforward to determine closed form solutions for the equilibrium. 
These two properties are proved in the Appendix. The equilibrium that is characterized by (3) is similar to the ones considered by Che and Gale (1996) . In the equilibrium outcome the fact that some players may own a budget that falls short of the value of the object they are bidding for can be inconsequential for the payo¤s. Intuitively, the reason why other bidders may expend small amounts of e¤ort does not matter to a player. The low e¤ort may occur because players cannot choose a higher e¤ort or because their randomization across the set of their feasible e¤ort levels given their actual budget constraints makes them choose a low e¤ort. However, a requirement for this equilibrium is that there is a su¢ ciently high probability that the bidders are able to make a bid to generate a bid distribution (3). The result also shows that the positive expected payo¤ drops to zero if the budget limits are su¢ ciently relaxed for a su¢ ciently large share of the players. Even though a player may know that the other contestants are likely to be constrained and unable to choose e¤ort with a cost up to the value of the prize, a player with a large budget cannot bene…t from this, as the player does not know whether the other contestants are actually more constrained or not.
11 11 The condition (2) and the condition for which equilibria of type (3) emerge leave considerable ground uncovered. A case in which the two conditions are "tight" is for n = 2 if F (m) is a uniform 9
We focus on equilibria in which the budget constraint is generally binding. It has been explained in the introduction why this may be a highly relevant case for many all-pay contests in which the prize that is at stake is a discounted present value of future incomes or bene…ts, whereas the e¤ort must be mobilized from what is currently available (with military con ‡ict or international war as prototypical examples).
Information alliances
We now turn to alliances. An alliance is de…ned here as an information-sharing device:
members of the same alliance know the actual budget constraints of all other members of their alliance before each player chooses his e¤ort. There may be several alliances.
But at this stage the grand alliance that encompasses all players is ruled out and discussed later. Further, the information asymmetry between players from di¤erent alliances remains as in section 2: for players from di¤erent alliances only the distribution F (m) is common knowledge. Note that in this framework an alliance is not a vehicle to add or compound the e¤orts of several players to a group's mega-e¤ort that may then beat the rivals or rival groups. 12 Further, while the formation of an alliance may generate an additional surplus to its members, or may generate a cost, the formation distribution on [0; b]. 12 We also disregard a possible wasteful con ‡ict about the distribution of the prize among alliance members here. As has been highlighted by Esteban and Sákovics (2003) and Gar…nkel (2004) , the possibility of wasteful internal …ghts about the distribution of a prize inside the alliance can be a major drawback to the formation of alliances. For a comprehensive survey that considers alliances with and without intra-alliance con ‡ict, see Bloch (2009) .
of an alliance is assumed to be cost neutral here. 13 The existence of an alliance is also neutral to the allocation rule: each player remains a single player and an independent decision maker, and the winner prize is allocated among individual contestants, as a function of their individual e¤ort choices. However, as a member of an alliance the player shares his and the other alliance members'private information about their budget limits (in terms of their individual maximum feasible e¤orts). All players learn about which alliances exist. And when choosing their e¤orts they take the existence of information sharing in these other alliances into consideration.
To characterize a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that corresponds to the equilibrium in Proposition 1 and to compare the payo¤s of players in the world without, and with information alliances we de…ne the interim payo¤ of player i: The interim payo¤ is the expected payo¤ of this player after learning his own budget limit but prior to learning the budget limits of other players. 
Proposition 2 Let the condition
(n n k )(F (x i )) n n k 1 F 0 (x i ) 1(4
Proof. (i)
Suppose that all other players j 6 = i follow the strategy described in the candidate equilibrium. Consider i 2 A k in the candidate equilibrium. If m i < maxfm s js 2 A k g, then x i = 0 is superior to any positive x i as it increases i's payo¤ by x i , compared to any x i > 0. If, instead, m i = maxfm s js 2 A k g, two cases need 13 Suppose joining an alliance causes a …xed cost upfront. If player i joins a particular alliance A r , this may cause a change in the beliefs of players who are not members of A r about i's budget.
Similarly, if a player does not join an alliance, this may be because his budget is too small to cover the fee, or because he has a very high budget. In any case, the appropriate equilibrium concept changes from Bayesian Nash to Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. to be distinguished. If m i = 0, then player i has no choice, and x i = m i = 0 is optimal. If m i > 0, then with probability 1 there is no other member of alliance A k who has the same budget. Accordingly, in the candidate equilibrium, all other members of the alliance A k choose zero e¤orts. Consider the payo¤ of player i from choosing x i 2 (0; m i ). The probability that player i wins with this e¤ort is equal to the probability that x i is larger than the largest budget in any of the other alliances, and this is the same probability as the probability that all players who are not a member of A k have a lower budget than x i . This probability is equal to (F (x i )) n n k .
Accordingly, player i's payo¤ is
This payo¤ is (weakly) increasing in the whole range (0; b) if
in this range. Hence, the condition
is su¢ cient for making x i = m i a choice that maximizes this player's payo¤.
(ii) Let the number of members of alliances A h and A k be n h 1 and n k 1, 14 Accordingly, as for a given m i the probability that i has the highest budget inside its alliance is decreasing in the number of members of the alliance, the probability that i expends positive e¤ort is lower for partition A 0 . Note also that the win probabilities do not depend on the particular partition, and the probability for expending positive e¤ort x i = m i depends only on the size of m i , on F (m) and on the number of players who are inside the same 14 Note that all events with maxfm s js 2 A h g = maxfm s js 2 A k g > 0 constitute a set of events that has zero probability exogenously (and independently of players' actions in previous stages), which is why we do not have to de…ne equilibrium strategies for this set of events. The proposition also shows that the information exchange that takes place in alliances reduces the total e¤ort, and that the members of the alliance are the only bene…ciaries of these savings.
Merger incentives and stability
To consider the incentives for contestants for a merger between alliances we need to describe the timing of the information-sharing in this case. We distinguish between two cases as regards this timing that are both plausible. In one case (Case 1) the process of possible mergers is completed before players mutually reveal the size of their budget among the alliance members. Alternatively, (Case 2) the alliance members learn about the budgets of the other members of their alliance prior to a possible further merger with another alliance. If they merge with another alliance, the members of both alliances also learn the budget constraints of the members of the merging alliances immediately after the merger, and all intra-alliance information exchange is completed prior to choosing their own e¤orts in the all-pay auction.
Proposition 3 Let there be a partition of the set N of all n players into r 3
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alliances fA 1 ; :::; A r g with numbers of members n 1 ; :::; n r . Consider a merger of two of these alliances A h and A k with numbers n h and n k of members that leads to a new alliance A h&k with n h + n k members. Let condition (7) also hold for n h&k = n h + n k .
The merger (weakly) increases the interim payo¤s of all members of A h and A k in Case 1. In Case 2, consider the expected payo¤s of players i h 2 A h who know their own budget and the budgets of the members of A h . The merger leaves these payo¤s of all players i h 2 A h with m i h 6 = maxfm s js 2 A h g unchanged and increases
(leaves unchanged) the expected payo¤ for i h 2 A h with m i h = maxfm s js 2 A h g if
Proof. To compare the payo¤s, without loss of generality we consider a player i from alliance A h . We need to distinguish between the two cases.
Case 1 holds as a corollary to Proposition 2. The proposition shows that a merger of alliances is bene…cial for the members of both alliances (or at least does not harm them), and the merger does not bene…t players who are not members of the merging alliances. This result emerges for both timings of information exchange in the process of mergers of alliances. Intuitively, if two alliances merge, the information exchange is extended towards the members of both alliances. For maxfm s js 2 A h g > 0 and maxfm s js 2 A k g > 0, without the merger the player from each of the two alliances who has the largest budget in this alliance expends e¤ort equal to his entire budget. Only one of them can win.
If the players know about each other's budget limits, one of them will abstain from expending a positive e¤ort, knowing that he cannot win against the other player. This information exchange occurs due to the merger, and prior to the choices of e¤orts.
The merger reduces the total expected e¤ort of all alliance members. However, it leaves the highest e¤ort from players in the merged group una¤ected. Given the (also unchanged) e¤ort choices of players outside the two merging alliances, the merging alliance as a whole has the same overall win probability, but expends lower e¤ort.
We can now use the results in Proposition 2 to brie ‡y discuss the stability of a partition of the set of all players into information alliances. We continue distinguishing between Case 1 and Case 2 regarding the timing of information exchange. Recall that in Case 1 we assume that players inside an alliance do not learn the budget constraints of the other players in the same alliance until a possibly endogenous process of mergers comes to a complete halt and no further possible mergers are allowed. In Case 2 we assume that players learn about the budget constraints of other members of the same alliance as soon as an alliance is formed, irrespective whether the merging alliances A h and A k are singletons or are alliances with more than one player. We de…ne a partition fA 1 ; :::; A k g as a stable partition if it has the following property:
(S1) Given A fA 1 ; :::; A k g, there are no two alliances A h 2 A and A k 2 A for which the merger of the two alliances to A h&k = A h [ A k is a (weak) Pareto improvement for the members of both alliances.
The stability criterion (S1) requires that, at the point at which the merger may be enacted, all members in an alliance (at least weakly) prefer non-merger to merger, for all possible mergers. We will consider the situation in which the grand coalition (A = fN g) is ruled out, and a situation in which the grand coalition is feasible. We …nd the following:
Proposition 4 Suppose a grand coalition (A = fN g) is not feasible. If the condition
1 holds for all n k < n 1, then the set of stable partitions is equal to the set of partitions with only two alliances fA 1 ; A 2 g. Also, individual players do not have an option to switch from one alliance to another here. The option to leave one alliance and to move to another alliance is a relevant issue. Individuals'preferences would be to be allocated to a large, rather than to a small alliance.
So far the grand alliance was excluded. Consider now the payo¤ consequences of the formation of a grand alliance, compared to a partition with two alliances. and have expected payo¤s equal to 1 m j for player i and equal to zero for player j in the equilibrium. 15 Consider whether players prefer the transition to the grand alliance to take place or not. We distinguish again between the two cases of timing as regards information exchange. actually have zero payo¤ in any case, but it yields some savings in futile e¤ort among the players with high budgets. 16 We …nd: if the grand alliance is feasible, endogenous alliance formation does not stop at a partition with two alliances.
Conclusions
When competing for a prize, players may often like to expend more e¤ort than they are able to expend. Also, players may know their own limits, but typically do not know the budget limits of their competitors. This incomplete information together with tight budget constraints may lead to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player simply expends his whole budget. The total sum of e¤ort costs expended does not exceed the value of the prize in this equilibrium in expectation, but in the equilibrium many players make futile e¤orts. Players would abstain from expending e¤ort if they knew that other players are less budget constrained and can simply outbid them. Therefore, players may be interested in forming groups for the purpose 16 The argument is slightly more complex than for alliance mergers in Proposition 4: due to the di¤erent nature of the contest equilibrium in the grand alliance, the players expending positive e¤ort after the formation of the grand alliance are not necessarily a subset of the players who expended positive e¤ort in the contest with two alliances. The formation of the grand alliance mobilizes the two players with the highest budgets, and these may well be from the same alliance A 1 or A 2 .
However, as this mobilized player with the second-highest budget has zero expected payo¤ also in the contest with a grand alliance, this does change the result.
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of information exchange among group members. We showed that this type of alliance formation bene…ts all players who join in such an alliance ex-ante, and does not harm them ex-post. We also showed that the bene…ts of an information alliance are typically higher if the alliance has more members, making larger alliances and the merger of alliances advantageous for members of the existing alliances. Also, such information alliances do not bene…t non-members of a respective alliance. These properties can also be used to explain why the endogenous formation of alliances leads to partitions with the smallest feasible number of alliances.
In the framework considered, the formation of alliances has only the purpose of information sharing, whereas alliances typically include more features in addition to an exchange of information about strength. This makes it di¢ cult to test the empirical predictions of our analysis directly. However, it is interesting to observe that the result by which the smallest number of alliances is desirable …ts well with the observed number of alliances in international con ‡icts that involved many nations.
The results in this paper may contribute to explaining why alliances are formed. Alliances may alleviate information problems among players and give its members superior information about each other. It may mean that its members share information that is otherwise private, and remains private vis-a-vis players who are not members of the alliance. We show that information sharing provides a strong incentive for the formation of alliances when budget constraints are su¢ ciently tight.
This bene…cial aspect of alliance formation may outweigh some of the aspects that establish the alliance formation puzzle and may contribute to the explanation why alliances are rather common, despite the problems of free-riding and …ghting inside the alliance. x i for the interior range x i 2 (0; minfm i ; 1g). In this range it holds that @ i (x i ) @x i = (n 1)F n 2 F 0 (x i ) 1 < 0.
For any given x i 2 (0; minfm i ; 1g), player i can increase the own payo¤ by a decrease in x i . Consider now (ii). The payo¤ of a player i in the candidate equilibrium with G j (x j ) = n 1 p x j for all j 6 = i is i (x) = ( n 1 p x i ) given that m i itself is a draw from a random distribution with cumulative distribution function F (m). For this purpose it is su¢ cient to show that G j (x j ) = n 1 p x j is feasible for F (m) with F (0) = 0 and (n 1)(F (m)) n 2 F 0 (m) < 1: The latter follows from the fact that (n 1)(G(x)) n 2 G 0 (x) = 1 > (n 1)(F (m)) n 2 F 0 (m).
